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ABSTRACT: The shocking statement made by Robert Fogelin over 20 years ago when he claimed that 
discourses that are in deep disagreement cannot be resolved rationally, is still causing many problems to 
argumentation theorists. In this paper, however, I argue that discourses that are in deep disagreement, at 
least some of them, can be rationally resolved by introducing the concept of “third party” to those particular 
discourses. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is fair to say that generally speaking discourse is directed at mutual understanding. 
Human beings have a capacity to come to a shared understanding and agreement. If 
nothing more, at least they accept the real issues that divide them from the other 
interlocutor. But if we presuppose this rich background of agreement, how does 
disagreement even arise? According to Fogelin (1985), one obvious answer is that people 
involved in an argumentative exchange often have an interest in the way the argument is 
resolved. It is in their interest in resolving the argument in their own favor. Moreover, 
observes Fogelin, arguing, like other human activities, is subject to abuse. Human beings 
seem to be gifted with innate capacities for messing things up. In short, intentionally or 
unintentionally, disagreement is present in our every day discussions despite the fact that 
engaging in an argumentative exchange presupposes a background of shared 
commitments. 
Sometimes, however, we have to deal with some discourses that show not only a 
“disagreement” in its simplest form, but discourses that are characterized as “deep 
disagreement” (Fogelin, 1985). In conflict situations, for example, things that would 
normally be taken for granted can suddenly become controversial. There are, for 
example, cases where parties to a conflict continue challenging each other’s positions 
regardless of the arguments presented by each other. There are many more conflicts 
concerning issues like positive discrimination, abortion, capital punishment, Schiavo’s 
case, “witnessing and heckling,”1 that prevent the discussion from developing any further 
because each party claims to have strong arguments for the position that they hold and 
 
1 “Witnessing and heckling” case is an interesting example of such situations. See more Van Eemeren, 
Grootendorst, Jackson and Jacobs, 1993.  
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not prepared to make any kind of concession to the other party.2 All these examples 
illustrate the fact that certain discussions get stuck from developing any further because 
there is no agreement on how certain facts can be tested between the parties. Such kinds 
of discussions are characterized as being in “deep disagreement.”  
 
2. THE ROLE OF “DEEP DISAGREEMENT” IN ARGUMENTATIVE DISCOURSE 
 
According to Fogelin (1985), an argumentative exchange is reasonable (he calls it 
“normal”), when it takes place within a context of broadly shared beliefs and preferences. 
There must exist joint procedures for resolving disagreements. Fogelin raises the question 
of what happens to arguments when the context is neither “normal” nor nearly normal. 
According to Fogelin, an argumentative exchange is normal “when it takes place within a 
context of broadly shared beliefs and preferences…there must exist shared procedures for 
resolving disagreements” (Fogelin, 1985 p. 6). If the argumentative exchange does not 
fulfil this condition of “broadly shared beliefs and preferences,” asserts Fogelin, the 
argument becomes impossible. According to Fogelin, everything becomes pointless 
because argumentative exchange appeals to something that does not exist: no shared 
background beliefs or preferences. Fogelin refers to this situation as one of “deep 
disagreement.”  
 Although it is not completely clear what Fogelin meant by “deep disagreement,” 
he did state clearly what is not included in this notion. Fogelin accepts that a 
disagreement can be intense without being deep, and it can be unresolvable without being 
deep (1985, p. 8). Therefore, “parties may be unbiased, free of prejudice, consistent, 
coherent, precise, and rigorous, yet still disagree with each other” (p. 8). Deep 
disagreements, argues Fogelin, keep on appearing even when normal criticisms have been 
answered. They are resistant to appeals to facts. According to Fogelin, we get a deep 
disagreement when the argument is generated by a clash of framework propositions (p. 
8). They are disagreements about fundamental principles. In short, deep disagreements 
are ones in which the “disputing parties lack a ‘normal’ background context of shared 
standards and beliefs, and are instead confronted with a collision of competing sets of 
belief, incapable of being disentangled through rational argumentation” (Adams 2005, p. 
66). They are disagreements in which none of the opposing parties is able to advance 
reasons as part of an argument that would make their opponent to accept their position. 
  According to Fogelin, “deep disagreement” is not always a case of 
misunderstanding. Deep disagreement is often a case of understanding too well the gap 
that separates you from others. But disagreement can be more or less rational depending 
on the reasons one has. Rational disagreement requires that you understand the claim that 
you are rejecting, and this calls for putting yourself in the shoes of other people. If 
participants are unwilling to make a sincere effort to assess their motives the discursive 
process will go nowhere.  
 I want to turn now to the main reason behind this paper. If “deep disagreements” 
can arise, what rational procedures can be used for their resolution? The same question 
                                                 
2 There are some authors like Lugg (1992), Adams (2005) and Feldman (2005) who disagree with Fogelin 
with regard to issues like abortion and positive discrimination calling them as issues being in a state of deep 
disagreement. For them, these issues are reasonable discussions although they have been debated for ages 
without any positive solution.  
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was posed by Fogelin over 20 years ago and he made some radical and shocking claims 
when he stated that there is nothing that we can do to resolve such disagreements. There 
is no way out of adjudicating a clash of this kind, maintained Fogelin, because the 
argument cannot play any role in resolving the disagreement because there is no shared 
background of beliefs and preferences. According to Fogelin, we can insist that not every 
deep disagreement is deep, that even with deep disagreements, people can argue well or 
badly. In the end, however, we should tell the truth: there are disagreements, sometimes 
on important issues, which by their nature, are not subject to rational resolution (Fogelin, 
1985, p. 11).  
 The same thing is maintained by Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, and 
Jacobs (1993), who claim that such types of disagreements pose an empirical challenge to 
their position because participants have simply not entered into discussion with a 
resolution-minded attitude (1993, p. 171). The existence of deep disagreements, claim 
Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, and Jacobs, sets a limit in principle on the problem 
solving validity of any procedural conception of argumentative reality (p. 171). 
According to these authors, the participants who are involved in such disagreements 
come to the discussion with interests they treat as privileged and as beyond debate. In 
such types of disagreements, both parties claim that the other is not an appropriate 
interlocutor. The misengagement is so great that each side sees it as evidence that the 
other side fails to meet basic requirements of rationality (Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, 
Jackson, and Jacobs (1993, pp.  171-2). Where differences are so immense that parties 
cannot even engage in procedures to negotiate procedures, argumentation cannot really 
get started (p. 172). 
 This pessimistic thesis about resolving disagreements, advanced especially by 
Fogelin (1985), has been rejected on many occasions by various scholars (Lugg 1992; 
Feldman 2005; Frieman 2005; and Adams 2005). Feldman, for instance, argued that 
disagreements can be rationally, even if the parties to the disagreement are not rational 
and would not resolve their disagreement by following the methods of rational 
argumentation (2005, p. 14). Feldman continues disagreeing with Fogelin by saying that 
just because two individuals have psychological make-ups that prevent their 
disagreement from being resolved, it does not follow that no rational resolution of their 
disagreement is available (p. 15). According to Feldman, disagreements can be resolved 
in three ways: both parties that are at disagreement can end up believing P, both can end 
up believing ~ P, or both can end up suspending judgment on the topic (2005, p. 16-7). 
 Other scholars like Adams (2005), argues against Fogelin’s position by criticizing 
the notion of deep disagreement in the first place because as Adams claims, Fogelin does 
not specify a priori conditions that make a disagreement deep. According to Adams, a 
deep disagreement can only be settled by exhausting the possible resources of normal 
discourse, and not shifting to “persuasion” as was maintained by Fogelin (1985, p. 11). 
Andrew Lugg (1992) criticized Fogelin’s position too, by concentrating on the two 
examples mentioned by Fogelin in explaining the notion of deep disagreement. For Lugg, 
it would be insane to say that debate on “abortion” and “positive discrimination” is such 
of a deep disagreement, as stated by Fogelin, because in those cases we have some 
fascinating arguments and a “normal” argumentative exchange from both sides of the 
divide, although the debate on these two issues still continues. 
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In this paper, however, I am not going to comment on these criticisms towards 
Fogelin’s position because that is not my aim. I have mentioned them here just to 
illustrate that there are numerous scholars who disagree with Fogelin’s position that there 
is no rational resolution to discourses that are engaged in deep disagreement. In this 
paper, however, I am going to advance another solution to such types of disagreement by 
introducing the notion of “third party.” 
 
3. THE ROLE OF “STANDOFF OF FORCE FIVE” IN ARGUMENTATIVE 
DISCOURSE 
 
Before presenting a new rational resolution to such discourses that are stuck in a “deep 
disagreement” I would like to introduce another interesting work related to such types of 
discourses, but this time with a completely different name. This is the work of John 
Woods (1992) that was presented under the name of “standoff of force five.” 
Disagreements, claims Woods (1992), sometimes generate mounting layers of 
intractability and so come within reach of a limit at which they go into a dialectical 
“black hole”, at which point conditions for further negotiation lapse (p. 4). According to 
Woods, situations like this may paralyse public discourse. This paralysis arises from 
argumentational setbacks that Woods calls “standoff of force five.” 
 According to Woods, standoffs of force five are closed-minded disagreements. 
Closed-minded disagreements are those disagreements the protagonists of which do not 
acknowledge that the opposite opinions are “real possibilities.” Force-fivers, claims 
Woods, require one to batten down the hatches and to head inland (Woods 1992, p. 8). A 
force fiver, claims Woods, could be described as one who resists resolution of a conflict 
by way of the general will even assuming that there is such a thing (p. 18). Woods 
mentions the case of “separatism in Quebec” as a case where the country was caught in a 
“standoff of force five” which was such that it could have left the country poised for civil 
war. On one side, claims Woods, we had people who wanted to separate from Canada, 
and on the other side we had some other people who wanted to remain inside Canada. 
Woods, also, mentions the case of abortion debate in Canada as an example of such 
intractable disagreement like standoff of force-five. 
Disagreements of this type, claims Woods, are close-minded, noisy and abusive, 
and often they involve issues of public policy which neither party is willing to surrender 
to any resolution mechanism which might give what each party respectively would regard 
as an unacceptable result. In short, claims Woods, such types of disagreements are the 
ones where a protagonist is unwilling to surrender to any mechanism which might decide 
against him (Woods 1992, p. 18). For Woods, these types of disagreement are logically 
irresolvable. There is nothing that we can do about such disagreements, argues Woods. 
In short, it can be seen that both these two concepts refer to the same thing: i.e., 
intractable disagreement heading towards a “black hole” where there is no returning back. 
Both Fogelin and Woods maintained that there is not much that can be done to rationally 
resolve such types of discourses. It was also shown that many scholars disagreed with 
such statements by proposing different rational solutions to the very same discourses that 
were depicted as irresolvable by Fogelin and later by Woods. In this paper, however, I 
will propose a completely new solution to the very same problem by introducing the 
concept of “third party.” 
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4. RESOLVING DEEP DISAGREEMENT THROUGH THE INCORPORATION OF 
“THIRD PARTY” 
 
The authors mentioned so far suggested clearly that there is no rational resolution to the 
discourses that are in an intractable disagreement. We saw that both Fogelin (1985) and 
Woods (1992) argued in favour of this position because discourses of this type defy the 
very conditions of having a “normal” argumentative discussion (Fogelin, 1985), and that 
the parties involved in such discourses are unwilling to accept the possibility that the 
other party might be right (Woods, 1992). The same thing, more or less, was maintained 
by Van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson and Jacobs (1993) who claim that such types of 
disagreement are difficult to handle, if not impossible, because participants have not 
entered into discussion with a resolution-minded attitude (p. 171). 
 It was stated also that there are many other authors who disagree with such a 
pessimistic position presented especially by Fogelin. Authors like Feldman (2005), 
Frieman (2005) and Adams (2005), just to mention a few, argued against Fogelin’s 
position by stating that such types of disagreements can be resolved rationally. It was 
stated that these authors, more or less, offered three solutions to such disagreements, like 
ending up believing P, ending up believing ~ P, or suspending judgement for the position 
at issue altogether. Without commenting on these solutions, because that is not my 
intention in this paper, we can simply say that there are many authors who disagree, 
especially with Fogelin, that deep disagreements cannot be resolved rationally. I disagree 
with Fogelin’s position as well, but I offer a completely different answer to the ones 
given by the above-mentioned authors. 
In order to understand clearly Fogelin’s position, I will make a concession by 
agreeing with him, as do many other authors, that discourses of deep disagreement nature 
do exist, albeit rare. However, just because an audience is not rational, it is not the case 
that we cannot argue with it. Just because two parties have nothing in common with 
regard to a certain problem, does not mean that we should ignore that particular discourse 
just because it is far away from resolving the disagreement at issue. We can still deal with 
such type of a discourse and pinpoint the defects of that particular discourse. At the same 
time, we can do yet another thing by going beyond the superficial level of the discourse 
trying to find the adequate picture of the audience. In the first level it might be true to 
find the discourse engaged in deep disagreement, but this discourse, in the second level, 
might not merely be so because it applies to different situations or different audiences 
(Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 477). If this is the case then, I argue that a 
discourse that has been identified as being engaged in deep disagreement, at the first 
level, can be resolved by introducing the concept of “third party,” at the second level.  
Here I just want to clarify that an insufficient picture of the audience, resulting 
from either lack of knowledge or an unexpected set of circumstances, can have 
unfortunate results both for the discourse itself and for the analyst as well. Having in 
mind that it often happens that a public speaker must persuade a composite audience, 
accepting people differing in character, loyalties, and functions, the analyst might find it 
hard to identify the “real” audience that the speaker is trying to reach. This in turn might 
pose problems for the discourse itself because it might find itself being engaged precisely 
in a deep disagreement. In such a situation, I argue, it is necessary to introduce the 
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concept of “third party” as a solution to such types of disagreement.3 If we do otherwise, 
not only that the analysts will find themselves disagreeing with each other with regard to 
deep disagreement, but also they would not do justice to the reconstruction and the 
analysis of the discourse, and this would immediately pose problems for the evaluation as 
well. 
My point of departure is that it is not very likely that human beings willingly enter 
into an intractable disagreement. Interlocutors will probably not know in advance that 
they will be locked into a “deep disagreement” and that they will continue to stick to their 
position no matter what. I believe that interlocutors often seem to be capable of behaving, 
more or less, according to the ideal conditions presupposed by the critical discussion 
model of pragma-dialectical approach. Therefore, the analyst is obliged to look more 
deeply into discourses that are characterized as being in deep disagreement because of the 
fact that interlocutors are capable of having a “normal” argumentative exchange. The 
reason why we are nonetheless faced with such discourses that are engaged in deep 
disagreement can be answered by the fact that this is happening at the first level of 
engagement, as mentioned earlier, but this is not so at the second level. In short, I believe 
that discourses that are in “deep disagreement,” at least some of them, can be treated as 
discourses that attempt resolution of difference of opinion, if we introduce the concept of 
“third party.”4  
In order to demonstrate the role of third party in discourses that are in deep 
disagreement, I am going to refer briefly to a case study from Macedonia. In 2001 
Macedonia faced a conflict that lasted about 7-8 months between Macedonian 
governmental forces and the Albanian armed groups living in Macedonia. During this 
period, the media, be that the local or the international one started covering this conflict 
from the fear that this conflict might have far worse consequences than all other conflicts 
witnessed throughout the Former Yugoslavia. Both the Macedonian and the Albanian 
language media, among all other things, were constantly concentrating on the causes of 
the conflict between the Macedonian governmental forces and the Albanian armed 
groups. The most noticeable observation in both sides of the media was the huge gap that 
existed in both camps with regard to the causes of the conflict. When seen from a birds 
eye perspective, one might be forgiven for claiming that we are talking of a completely 
two different conflicts. On one hand, the Macedonian language media was constantly 
claiming that the conflict was caused by the actions of Albanian people for creating the 
“Greater Albanian” state. On the other hand, however, the Albanian language media was 
constantly claiming that the conflict was initiated in order to get “Greater Rights” for the 
Albanians living in Macedonia. The discourse by Macedonian and Albanian language 
media displays precisely the kind of incommensurability of viewpoints that has been 
discussed until now. The columns presented in the newspapers are patently incapable of 
                                                 
3 The concept of “third party” is offered only as a solution to my case study. I am not that sure whether this 
would function for other cases of deep disagreement because it is possible that in such cases we have 
multiple parties.  
4 In a personal communication with Scott Jacobs, he said that “third party” can play a significant role in 
resolving the problem of discourses that are in “deep disagreement.” Scott Jacobs: “I believe that you are 
right about the “third party” aspect of (at least some) deep disputes. In my dissertation about “witnessing 
and heckling,” there was a clear sense in which the preachers are witnessing before God, and they think of 
God as something like an audience whose evaluations serve as the standard for their demonstrations.  
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generating resolutions of disagreements. The discourse displays a “deep disagreement” of 
the highest magnitude. 
Since I cannot bring in excerpts from both sides of the media due to the space 
allocated for this paper, I can only say that columns selected from the Macedonian and 
the Albanian language media have generated a deep disagreement of the highest 
magnitude if taken as a discussion between the Macedonian and the Albanian language 
media. The discussion has to be viewed in this direction due to the fact that the 
disagreement was between these two sides of the media with regard to what caused the 
conflict. The Macedonian language media was trying to reach across at the other side by 
claiming that the conflict started because of the creation of “Greater Albania.” On the 
other hand, the Albanian language media was trying to do the same thing by addressing 
the other side that the conflict started in order to get “Greater Rights.” At this superficial 
level, there are clear indications that the disagreement is between the Macedonian and the 
Albanian language media with regard to the causes of the conflict, and that this 
discussion has generated a deep disagreement of the type that Fogelin was referring to. 
However, if we go beyond this superficial level, the analyst can reveal that there 
is a presence of another audience that I think plays a crucial role in reconstructing better 
the discussion between the Macedonian and the Albanian language media. This role is 
played by the “international community” and by the international community is meant the 
entire West. When we analyze the discussion at the second level, we can see that both the 
Macedonian and the Albanian language media were not trying to reach at each other, but 
at the international community. Both these two sides of the media function as a kind of a 
bridge in reaching the international community. The reason why these two sides of the 
media function as a bridge in reaching the international community, and not addressing it 
directly, is because there was absolutely no disagreement with the international 
community on the causes of the conflict. Both the Macedonian and the Albanian 
language media could not address the international community directly because the 
international community was not part of the discussion at all. The issue of “Greater 
Albania” and the issue of “Greater Rights” had nothing to do with the international 
community. The Macedonian and the Albanian language media were simply attempting 
to convince the international community that the conflict started because of “Greater 
Albania” and not because of “Greater Rights,” respectively. 
Having done all this, we can see now that the discourse should be reconstructed as 
such where the international community is incorporated inside the discussion between the 
Macedonian and the Albanian language media. This reconstruction will produce a kind of 
a triangle where the international community is on top of the discussion playing a role of 
a judge. This role meant as if the international community or the West are the only party 
that can judge the reasonableness of the arguments presented by both the Macedonian and 
the Albanian language media with regard to the issue of “Greater Albania” and “Greater 
Rights,” respectively. This kind of reconstruction opens the way for defending the claim 
made earlier with regard to the role of “third party,” i.e. the international community in 
resolving discourses that are stuck in deep disagreement. 
From this superficial analysis, we can see that what was considered as a deep 
disagreement at the first level, cannot be said the same thing at the second level, when 
incorporating the “third party” into the same discourse. The deep disagreement that was 
created in the discussion between the Macedonian and the Albanian language media is 
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inexistent when incorporating the international community or the West into the discourse. 
At this stage, we can see a “normal” argumentative exchange, to use Fogelin’s concept, 
between the Macedonian and the Albanian language media in relation to the international 
community. The reasoning of the Macedonian and the Albanian language media is part of 
the appeal to the common beliefs, values, and starting points in relation to the 
international community or the West. Therefore, with the incorporation of “third party” 
into those discourses that are in deep disagreement, at least some of them, we can have a 
normal disagreement where parties into a discussion will attempt to resolve it through the 
use of arguments.  
 
5. ESTABLISHING CRITERIA FOR RECOGNIZING “THIRD PARTY”  
 
Until now, I have been discussing the role of “third party” in those discourses that are at 
deep disagreement. It was mentioned that certain discourses sometimes address other 
audiences than the one addressed directly. It was mentioned that in those cases in which 
the antagonist is called upon it becomes necessary to develop as accurate a projection of 
this antagonist as possible in order that the rhetorical moves employed by the protagonist 
be as persuasive as possible. It was shown that discourses of which we do not know who 
the “real” audience is, creates real difficulties for both the protagonist and the analyst. 
Govier (1999) argues that the problem with such an audience from the perspective of the 
protagonist is that “one knows so little about it and cannot interact with it at the stage 
when one needs to do so in order to improve the quality of one’s argument” (1999, p. 
195). Therefore, how can one recognize whether the discourse is referring to the 
Macedonian or Albanian language media respectively, in the case study at hand, or the 
international community, as mentioned earlier? In short, how can we establish that a 
certain discourse involves a “third party” or not? 
According to Bitzer (1968), there are two conditions or criteria for recognizing 
who the “real” audience is that the discourse is referring to. The first criterion, according 
to Bitzer, is that an audience in a discourse is the one that must be “capable of being 
influenced.” There must be a certain elementary level of regard and openness to the 
speaker or writer’s arguments. For Bitzer, it does not make any sense to try to persuade 
an audience if that audience is not capable of being persuaded.5 If the audience does not 
have this condition, argues Bitzer, then it would be fruitless or even impossible to try to 
influence an audience. 
I use this condition by Bitzer, as a first criterion of recognizing the role of “third 
party” in an argumentative discourse. It simply means that an analyst is supposed to 
search inside the discourse an audience that can be influenced. This criterion would not 
allow any discourse of the type of “deep disagreement” where the parties in a discussion 
stick to their own position regardless of the strengths of the arguments by the other party. 
In such a situation, no audience is capable of being influenced. Bringing this criterion to 
the case study at hand, we would say that according to Bitzer, we have to search for an 
                                                 
5 It is possible, of course, for the discussants in practice not to think in the same way as does Bitzer. 
Nevertheless, this idea corresponds to what was stated earlier that it would be naïve to suggest that 
discussants willingly enter into such discussions of intractable disagreement. At the superficial level, it 
might look like that discussants continue to attempt to persuade even those that seems cannot be persuaded, 
but at a more deeper level, discussants seem to address those that can be persuaded. 
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audience that is capable of being influenced, i.e. the international community, and to 
ignore the discussion between the Macedonian and Albanian language media because of 
the fact that both of them stick to their own position without any chance of being 
influenced by one another.6  
The second condition, which for the case study at hand is even more important, 
says that an audience is that group of individuals who have the capacity to act as 
“mediators of change.” According to Bitzer, an audience is that person or group of people 
that has the capacity to change things. If an audience does not have that capability to 
change things in favor of the one or the other side, then there is no need to try to persuade 
them in the first place. Usually, this type of audience that acts as “mediators of change” is 
more “powerful” than the one who is directly addressed, or that is physically present 
during the discussion.7
In the case study at hand, this particular audience can be recognized quite easily 
because of the fact that at the time the international community was the only party 
capable of playing the role of mediators of change because they were powerful enough to 
play this role. On the other hand, this criterion implies that it does not make any sense to 
consider the Macedonian or the Albanian language media as if they attempt to persuade 
each other because none of them had that capacity to play the role of mediators of 
change. Inferring from Bitzer’s condition, it would be naïve to imply that the Macedonian 
language media were attempting to convince the Albanian side because this side did not 
had that capacity to change things. The same thing might be said about the other side as 
well.  
These two criteria, of course, are not the only ones. Someone might probably 
introduce completely new ones, but for the case study at hand, I think that these two 
criteria are quite useful in identifying the role of third party, i.e. the international 
community. I must say that it would be naïve to state that these two criteria are universal 
ones in the sense that they can be applied to every kind of discourse. Probably these two 
criteria should be tested to see whether they have a firm ground, but at this stage I can 
only say that they are sufficient for helping me identifying the role of third party, i.e. 
international community, in the case study at hand. There is no intention on my part to 
generalize these two criteria to other types of discourses. 
                                                 
6 In the case study at hand, the international community is the only possibility, because as mentioned 
previously, they are an audience that can be persuaded, and that they had to be persuaded having in mind 
the interest by both sides of the media to persuade the international community.  
7 In a personal communication with Anthony Blair, he said that Bitzer’s second condition is not a necessary 
condition. He said that there is a distinction to be made between the audience that actually has the capacity 
to act as mediators of change, and the audience that the speaker believes has the capacity to act as 
mediators of change. I have seen my colleagues argue with the university administration against announced 
cuts to programs when the decisions that made those cuts inevitable had already been taken and were not 
reversible. You might say that my colleagues were acting unreasonably. And yet their making those 
arguments seemed to perform some function. One function would be to “go on record” as being opposed to 
the cuts, so that if at some future time the cuts proved to have bad consequences, those who argued against 
them at the time they were made would be seen to have foresight, and so their ethos would be strengthened 
in future argumentation. I do agree with Blair with regard to this criticism towards Bitzer’s second 
condition, but I do believe that this criticism is valid only for certain cases. In the case study at hand, this 
criterion functions superbly because the audience, i.e. the international community had the capacity to act 
as mediators of change and that both Macedonian and Albanian language media believed that international 
community had that capacity. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
The aim of this modest paper was to shed some light to the already existing debate on the 
implications of Fogelin’s idea that there is no rational resolution to discourses that are 
characterized as being in deep disagreement (The Journal of Informal Logic has 
dedicated a special issue to this debate). I tried to summarize most of research done on 
this topic without any intention to comment on the solutions presented by various 
scholars to the idea that there is no rational solution to discourses that are stuck in deep 
disagreement. In this paper, I tried my best to provide another solution by reconstructing 
the discourse in a more careful way with the introduction of “third party.” By working on 
a case study, albeit very superficially, I tried to show the role played by the international 
community in understanding a discourse better, although at the beginning the same 
discourse was considered part of what Fogelin called “deep disagreement.” Through this 
reconstruction, the discourse that at first level was treated as “abnormal,” at the second 
level became “normal” thanks to the role played by the “third party.” At the end, I tried to 
provide some criteria, not meant to be exclusive at all, in helping us identifying the role 
played by the third party, i.e. international community. 
 
link to commentary
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